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Abstract  
In the mid-2000s, Indonesia became ‘ground zero’ for an outbreak of highly pathogenic 
avian influenza, the H5N1 strain, which global health experts feared would cause a 
devastating pandemic. When asked to participate in global health measures, Indonesia’s 
minister of health argued that the country had ‘viral sovereignty’ and refused to share 
samples with the World Health Organization’s Global Influenza Surveillance and Response 
System. The global health community claimed, in response, that such refusal put all 
humanity at risk. Both sides of the debate expressed paranoia, resentment, and mistrust as 
their different ideas of security came into play. In the midst of these accusations and 
counteraccusations, little attention was paid to the larger social and ecological context in 
which the virus had emerged and flourished. I argue that when vital matter gets taken up 
within frameworks of security, human and animal bodies, narratives, and politics get scripted 
through concerns for biological and political vulnerability. Paranoia, resentment, and 
mistrust resonate as the multiple vulnerabilities of bodies and their social positioning frame 
uncertain futures.  
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A post-humanist, realist ontology is not an anti-human ontology, but is rather an 
ontology where humans are no longer monarchs of being but instead are among 
beings, entangled in beings, and implicated in other beings. 
 – Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects 
 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States was awash in biocentric fears: Iraq 
had been falsely accused of stockpiling biological weapons; anthrax had been sent through 
the US mail, killing five; and the United States was vaccinating health care professionals in 
anticipation of a weaponized smallpox attack. Across the global North, biological security 
was being articulated most prominently in relation to issues of bioterror and biodefense, 
novel disease emergence, food safety, and invasive species. On the other side of the globe, 
the H5N1 avian influenza, or ‘bird flu’, had emerged in Indonesia and was being viewed as a 
possible pandemic and a threat to American civilization.1 As Americans were ‘prepping’ for 
apocalypse, the use of hand sanitizer became widely adopted, a popular, everyday response 
to pandemic risks inherent in the infrastructures of globalization (Kim 2015).  
Global humanitarian governance is intended to supersede the sovereignty of the state, yet 
organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO) require the permission and 
cooperation of donor nations to work within their borders. As H5N1 influenza spread, 
Indonesia was asked to participate in pandemic preparedness, share disease samples, and 
other technomedical activities, which required it to turn its attention away from its own 
pressing concerns, like eradicating malaria and dengue fever. Indonesian institutions were 
expected to adopt this new securitized approach to health, that is, to anticipate future events 
and help prepare and secure the global bios rather than focus exclusively on the well-being 
of Indonesian citizens.2 Pandemic preparedness included separating humans and livestock 
from microbes whose increasing virulence was presumed to be natural, rather than, for 
example, a consequence of human systems of modern agriculture. But Indonesia resisted 
being interpolated into the security framework championed by the global health community, 
partly on the grounds of national sovereignty. And when Indonesia rejected these Northern 
 
1  Director of the Center for Biosecurity of the University of Pittsburgh Tara O’Toole said: ‘What we 
are talking about is not just another health issue – it is a nation-busting issue’ (Greger 2006, 357).  
2  At an International Ministerial Pledging Conference in Beijing in 2006, US$1.9 billion were raised 
(primarily from the United States and Europe) to fight pandemic influenza. The money would be 
used for surveilling human and animal disease, altering agrarian practice, compensating farmers 
whose poultry were culled, improving laboratory and health services, and communicating outbreaks 
(Cheng 2006).  
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forms of securitization, 3 many in the global health community became skeptical of the 
country’s sincerity and competence.  
Throughout the mid- to late 2000s, as the effort to stop H5N1 influenza from turning into a 
global pandemic advanced, I conducted multisited fieldwork in the worlds of Indonesian 
microbiology, security, and agriculture, seeking to understand transformations in the 
approach to viral outbreaks. Work in postcolonial science studies shows that it makes a 
difference from whose standpoint scientific questions are raised (Hayden 2003; Lowe 2006; 
Tallbear 2013). What happens as Northern fears and forms of securitization slide across 
disparate spaces and are introduced in other, non-Northern places, like Indonesia? Scholars 
working in science and technology studies argue that how we attempt to know vital matter, 
and how the material world responds, is also important (van Dooren 2016; Lowe and 
Münster 2016; Tsing 2015). What happens when we view viral objects through the lens of 
security instead of human or animal care? In the Indonesian H5N1 outbreak, one important 
result was that many Indonesians began to resent the international intervention and believe it 
was irrelevant to the health of their own population. Some even viewed it as a conspiracy to 
dominate Indonesia. Others in the international global health community viewed Indonesian 
statements about sovereignty as a form of illegitimate self-interest. Looking at the case of 
Indonesia, we can see that the work of grappling with the viral object suffered in important 
ways. Relations between humans, animals, and microbes and issues of how we are ‘among 
beings, entangled in beings, and implicated in other beings’ were ultimately exhausted by 
their embeddedness in issues of human identity and resentment (or ‘ressentiment’).4  
Measures of security and health in Kabanjahe, North Sumatra 
In August 2006, Indonesia’s Minister of Health Siti Fadilah Supari, Coordinating Minister for 
People’s Welfare Aburizal Bakrie, and Agricultural Minister Anton Apriyantono arrived in 
the hamlet of Simbul in the village of Kebanjahe, North Sumatra. Stepping out from their 
vehicles, they quickly dressed in the white Tyvek suits, face masks, and protective eye 
goggles they had brought with them as measures of individual biosecurity. They were there 
to inspect the culling of poultry in the vicinity of a group of human H5N1 cases known as 
 
3  The origins of securitization can be traced to different moments in time. Peluso and Watts (2001) 
have traced it to the end of the Cold War, while Collier, Lakoff, and Rabinow (2004) have linked it to 
the birth of the genome sciences. 
4  Ressentiment is Nietzsche’s idea that ‘slave revolt’ begins when resentment becomes a creative force. 
He views slave morality in negative and reactive terms originating in the denial of what is different 
from it.  
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the ‘Karo cluster’ (Butler 2006; Sipress 2010). While there were no reported cases of H5N1 
in Simbul, this area was under heavy surveillance. In the nearby village of Kubu Sembelang, 
eight human cases of H5N1 influenza had emerged in one family, with seven fatalities. The 
timing of those illnesses was the most significant indication that human-to-human-to-human 
transmission had occurred, a dreaded sign of mutations that might signal the virus’s capacity 
to spread between humans and the start of the prophesied human pandemic. In light of 
these deaths, the Indonesian government was accused of responding too slowly to emerging 
events (Butler 2006). 
The WHO alerted the Switzerland-based Roche Corporation that they might be called upon 
to send supplies of the antiviral drug Tamiflu. They believed the drug might help create a 
cordon sanitaire around the population to halt transmission before it really caught fire, 
although an article in the Lancet (2006, 1550) states, ‘The idea that within a week or two of a 
pandemic’s initiation we could quench it by saturating a ring of at-risk population with 
oseltamivir [Tamiflu], achieving 90% coverage and high compliance, and at the same time 
impose movement restrictions and social distancing … is simply fanciful’. Drug readiness 
was, nevertheless, a sign of pandemic preparedness; similarly, the public appearance of three 
of Indonesia’s top ministers far outside the Indonesian capital was an act of security theater. 
Their visit was designed to convince the people of Karo that the poultry culls in their 
community were part of an important national strategy to stamp out the bird flu and to 
signal to the international community that Indonesia was taking the H5N1 outbreak and 
these recent ominous developments seriously. What the ministers were not able to convey to 
the local community was any ability to care for sick patients or poultry.  
Security measures are not always measures of human or animal health, and these days global 
health looks to secure the future. Its precursor, international health, was a form of 
development aid encompassing projects like family planning, vaccination, and nutrient 
supplementation. If older forms of development aid and public health were about 
‘population security’ – described by Andrew Lakoff (2017, 38) as ‘measures to protect the 
population against regularly occurring internal threats such as illness, industrial accidents, or 
infirmity’ – this new form of securitized health is more closely related to what he names 
‘vital systems security’, or ‘the event whose probability cannot be calculated but whose 
consequences are potentially catastrophic’. For Indonesia, the probability had already been 
calculated, and the chance of global pandemic was presumed to be quite high, conceived of 
as ‘when, not if’. While it was taken for granted that the outbreak in Indonesia could easily 
be the beginning of a pandemic, the issue for the international community seemed to be how 
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to keep the H5N1 virus in place in Southeast Asia so that it did not threaten the global 
North or the international economy.5  
Development aid is a helping practice but historically was also designed to create a 
population that might ‘resist Communism’ or ‘modernize’ along W. W. Rostow’s 
developmental trajectory.6 Now, as the aid model recedes in global health, the future of 
health takes the shape of emergency preparedness, drug stockpiling, public communications, 
and poultry culling, among other techniques. This notion of ‘health’ does not entail 
providing care or directly serving a sick public; rather, it is concerned with protecting a state 
and its critical infrastructure and is a response to modernization risks. It places at its center 
new and emerging biological threats at the expense of well-known, common, predictable, 
and prevalent maladies that continue to plague a population. The shift entails new forms of 
expertise and knowledge making through which diseases, viewed as threats or hazards, are 
known and managed, and it encompasses a new form of future-oriented imaginary (Collier 
and Lakoff 2008).  
The H5N1 outbreak was not only a threat to humans; it was also a threat to a network of 
interconnected nonhuman populations – poultry, wild birds, swine, zoo animals, microbes – 
brought together in an assemblage centered on a rapidly mutating influenza virus. Indeed, 
the chicken would turn out to be this strain’s most substantial victim at both the Indonesian 
and global scales.7 Within the new security configuration, both the future of viral matter and 
its ability to surprise as well as the technocratic potential to tame the virus were at stake. 
Farm biosecurity includes the means to separate humans, animals, and their pathogens, 
attempting to keep each in its appropriate realm to prevent the spread of viruses and 
bacteria. The protective clothing worn by the Indonesian ministers was intended to secure 
these important personages from possible contact with the virus. The suits were an 
admission of the vitality of the influenza virus, a recognition that H5N1 was as much ‘force 
as entity’ (Bennett 2010). This indeterminate agency of the virus was as important to the 
outbreak scenario as was technical expertise. 
 
5  The World Bank estimated that the influenza pandemic would cost the global economy US$3 trillion 
(Gale 2008). 
6  W. W. Rostow was a Cold Warrior who argued in The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (1960) that there were five universal stages to economic development and that promoting 
economic development was the way to prevent the appeal of communism in postcolonial nations. 
7  The number of poultry deaths from H5N1, both directly from the disease and from culling, is 
estimated to be in the hundreds of millions.  
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Viral sovereignty 
The possibility of an H5N1 influenza pandemic in the mid-2000s was a health event with a 
future orientation, what Carlo Caduff (2015) has called the ‘pandemic perhaps’. Indonesia 
was at the center of this speculative deadly event, the location where the highly pathogenic 
avian virus was most likely to infect humans and evolve the capacity for sustained human-to-
human transmission. Framed as a potential existential threat to human life on Earth and as 
an actual concrete threat to poultry lives, new responses were demanded of the Indonesian 
nation. New institutions, like the National Commission on Avian Influenza and Pandemic 
Preparedness (Komite Nasional Pengendalian Flu Burung dan Kesiapsiagaan Menghadapi 
Pandemi Influenza), were formed; old institutions, like the Jakarta offices of the WHO, the 
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the Indonesian Department of 
Agriculture, were refocused on influenza; research programs, like the collaboration between 
the US Naval Medical Research Unit II and the Ministry of Health, were shifted in focus, in 
this case from malaria to influenza; and new practices, like biosecurity measures and 
communications strategies that attempted to change relations between Indonesians and their 
livestock, were enacted. Money and expertise were directed away from common problems 
like dengue fever and toward a speculative outbreak that, to date, has still not affected great 
numbers of Indonesians.8  
Indonesia would be brought into H5N1 pandemic preparedness on new terms, yet from 
within older established humanitarian hierarchies. Indonesia was asked to be responsible not 
only for protecting its own citizens against the outbreak and providing for their well-being 
but also for protecting the world from a potential scourge identified and defined by the 
global health community in its own image. With its emphasis on universal human suffering 
in a potential influenza outbreak, the rhetoric of medical humanitarianism in the influenza 
intervention overlooked the specificities of how agendas would be set, who would be 
protected, and how the benefits of preparedness protocols would be shared. According to 
Peter Redfield (2012), humanitarianism is part of a contemporary ‘architecture of sentiment 
and judgment’, and, he writes, ‘a humanitarian sensibility thus both defines the proper mode 
of political conduct and suggests a limit to it’. While compelled by international agreements, 
Indonesia’s participation was framed as a humanitarian endeavor responding to moral claims 
about the unified vulnerability of humanity, yet this same ‘humanity’ was not equally 
protected from the influenza ‘apocalypse’ by, for example, access to drug therapies in the 
event of an outbreak. Far from an abstract good, pandemic preparedness plans slid across a 
 
8  One hundred and ninety-nine human cases of H5N1 were recorded in Indonesia between 2003 and 
2017. Among these were 167 deaths. 
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dispersed set of technical and moral worlds that apportioned different costs and different 
benefits for Indonesians and the international community. 
Leading Indonesia’s response to the H5N1 outbreak was Indonesia’s Minister of Health Dr. 
Siti Fadilah Supari,9 who became known for standing up to the WHO and the global health 
community over the issue of H5N1. As the apparatus of global health descended upon 
Jakarta, pulling Indonesian time and resources into the cause of a speculative outbreak, she 
responded with a remarkable claim: Indonesians don’t get the flu, and if they do, they deal 
with it through kerokan (the Southeast Asian practice of dermabrasion therapy known in 
English as ‘coining’). Her desire to transform the understanding of the problem and its 
solutions was an attempt to wrest control of the avian-influenza intervention away from the 
international community. She did this by positing a unique Indonesian body, one that was 
both resistant to influenza and imbued with the historical memory of Indonesia’s colonial 
experience (Fassin 2007). Indonesia, she argued, did not require what she perceived as a 
neocolonial intervention into her country’s infrastructure and an affront to Indonesia’s 
sovereignty. The future of Indonesian health would not be universal, nor would Indonesia 
forget its past.  
Dr. Supari’s most momentous act, in what she understood as the defense of her country, was 
to cease sharing samples of Indonesian strains of H5N1 virus with the WHO. Her refusal 
was grounded in an ethic of ‘viral sovereignty’, her neologism for the idea that biological 
samples from Indonesian patients are a form of local biodiversity and therefore part of 
Indonesia’s national patrimony. Describing her resistance to sample sharing, she wrote: ‘In 
fact capitalism had not only made certain countries exploit the natural resources of the 
developing countries. They also exploited part of the human body from the powerless 
country. They took our blood. They took our cell. They took our antibody. And perhaps it 
would be more dangerous when in the end they would take our brain cell as well, to be re-
engineered to create a new generation of slaves’ (Supari 2007, 119). In this case, the viral 
outbreak did not ignite fears of a repeat of the 1918 influenza pandemic, a main imaginative 
 
9  Dr. Supari is a practicing cardiologist and member of the faculty of the University of Indonesia. She 
was an unlikely candidate for minister of health, with little experience and few connections with the 
international global health community in 2004. As President Susilo Bambang Yudyhono was trying to 
balance out political influences within his cabinet, Dr. Supari was put forward by Muhammadiyah, 
Indonesia’s second-largest Islamic organization. As minister, she instituted a program of poor 
people’s health insurance (Askeskin); initiated a program (Obat Serba Seribu) where generic medicines 
for cough, cold, diarrhea, etc., could be purchased by anyone for ten cents; and starred in a talk show, 
A Chat with Ms. Minister (Bincang Bincang Bersama Bu Mentri), on TV One to publicize the work of the 
health ministry. 
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resource for how the pandemic potential of the H5N1 strain was interpreted 
internationally.10 Instead, the securitization response set off a cascade of resentment and 
suspicion on the part of many in Indonesia who feared the intentions of the international 
community more than they feared an opaque viral particle with a speculative future.  
The modern system of sample sharing originated more than sixty years ago with the 
perceived need for an annual influenza vaccine. The composition of the annual virus is a 
future-oriented prediction based upon information about strains of influenza circulating nine 
months in advance of the flu season in either hemisphere. Influenza strains are constantly 
mutating and shifting. Because the flu mutates so rapidly, a ‘holy grail’ vaccine, one that 
covers all influenza types, does not exist. Instead, samples of ‘wild viruses’ are aggregated 
from ill patients at collecting sites in over one hundred countries around the world. These 
countries send representative material samples to the WHO’s Collaborating Centers for 
Reference and Research on Influenza, located in Atlanta, Tokyo, London, Melbourne, and 
Beijing. Twice a year, based on influenza surveillance and clinical observations, the WHO 
then recommends which strains to include in a seasonal flu vaccine. They publish these 
recommendations and share ‘seed strains’ (actual viral material) with the industry to allow 
pharmaceutical companies to produce an annual flu vaccine that best matches the season’s 
predicted strains.  
The WHO’s surveillance system, called the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response 
System (GISRS), has been in place since 1952, and more than one hundred countries 
presently share influenza viruses with the GISRS. In addition to providing an annual flu 
vaccine recommendation, GISRS has the responsibility to provide influenza risk assessments 
and track emerging pandemic strains of influenza. No specific material difference 
distinguishes a potential pandemic strain from any other presently circulating influenza, but 
the WHO wants to be prepared when one turns deadly on the ground. When new H5N1 
strains appear they are supposed to be passed along to the WHO so the organization can 
track the virus’s emergence and geographic spread. Indonesia initially sent samples of H5N1 
off to the WHO, as it had agreed to under international law.  
Modern molecular biology is only made possible by transnational biological exchange, what 
Eugene Thacker (2006) calls the ‘global genome’: the amalgam of genetic material, political, 
and technological flows across borders in the current practices of biological science. Thacker 
(2006, 7) defines biological exchange as ‘the circulation and distribution of biological 
 
10  The 1918 pandemic of H1N1 influenza caused the death of 3 to 5 percent of the world’s population  
(Taubenberger and Morens 2006, 15). 
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information, be it in a material or immaterial instantiation, that is mediated by one or more 
value systems’. Sharing influenza samples is likewise a practice of biological circulation 
organized under the sign of the global and working across varied terrains of technical 
capacity, purpose, and value. While the international community presented the H5N1 
outbreak as an event of global significance that required cooperation, Dr. Supari argued that 
Indonesia might end up paying for proprietary vaccines made by foreign pharmaceutical 
companies, made from samples it had given to the international community for free out of 
humanitarian concern. Moreover, in the case of a global pandemic, these drugs might be in 
short supply, and Indonesia, although it had provided the key material ingredient for the 
drug’s manufacture, might not have privileged access to them. The compulsory nature of the 
international sample-sharing mechanism appeared to benefit the global North at the expense 
of countries, like Indonesia, Egypt, or Mexico, with actual highly pathogenic influenza cases. 
Dr. Supari pressed the WHO to accept the idea that the nation, not the world community as 
represented by the WHO, held the rights to viral samples and should control their future. 
She argued that the 1992 UN Convention on Biological Diversity, which protects a nation’s 
rights to the genetic diversity found within its borders, extends even to the microbial 
diversity found in Indonesia and obviates Indonesia’s obligations under the international 
sample-sharing mechanism of the WHO. Thus, Indonesia’s minister of health demanded the 
international community recognize that the viral material underlying the international 
influenza regime was the property of Indonesia, required the consent of the Indonesian 
government to be shared, and needed a formal Material Transfer Agreement to move 
between countries (Sedyaningsih 2008). Why should individual pharmaceutical companies 
profit from the humanitarianism of the sample-sharing countries? 
To promote Supari’s concept of viral sovereignty, Indonesia hosted a high-level meeting of 
national health ministers and WHO officials in 2007, where representatives discussed how 
samples could be shared equitably and benefits distributed fairly. They adopted the ‘Jakarta 
Declaration’, a document that emphasized sharing benefits (including data, information, and 
affordable vaccines) resulting from the circulation of biological specimens (KBRI Ottawa 
2007). Under Supari, Indonesia was again a leader of the postcolonial world, reviving the 
glory of its first president, Sukarno, who along with India’s Nehru, Egypt’s Nasser, Ghana’s 
Nkrumah, and Yugoslavia’s Tito led the nonaligned world to resist the imperialism of both 
the East and West Cold War blocs. Supari (2007, 35) wrote, ‘As a generation born in the 
beginning of the 1950s, I still remember that Indonesia once had Soekarno, one of the 
founders of the Republic, a great leader who had become the inspiration for many nations 
under colonialism both in Asia and Africa to fight for their own independence’. 
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Dr. Supari is the one who first publicly outlined the argument about the inequities in the 
international sample-sharing system and brought them to the attention of the global health 
community (KBRI Ottawa 2007). Her intervention links the potential exploitation of 
Indonesia to the injustices other marginalized populations have experienced as subjects of 
scientific research. The well-known story of the HeLa cell line (Skloot 2010) concerns an 
African American woman, Henrietta Lacks, who had cervical cancer; her tumor cells were 
the first cells ever grown successfully in a cultured medium. While HeLa cells made possible 
the experimental processes that resulted in a successful polio vaccine and other critical 
medical breakthroughs, Lacks’s cells were taken, cultured, and sold without her permission. 
Today, while these cells continue to be sold throughout the world for medical research, 
Lacks’s descendants are unable to afford their own health care. In an ironic twist, what was 
originally done without Lacks’s knowledge has been reframed, retrospectively, by drug 
manufacturers and researchers as a humanitarian gesture on the part of the Lacks family.  
Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2012) has written an overarching account of research from the 
perspective of the researched. Noting that Christopher Columbus and James Cook were 
both circumnavigating the world on research missions, she observes that research has always 
been linked to imperialism. Becoming the object of research can be painful. Lacks’s daughter 
Deborah felt acute pain on learning that her mother’s cells have been blown up in nuclear 
explosions, shot into space, and stored at subzero temperatures (see Radin [2017] on the 
‘ghosts who haunt the archives of human biology’). Research has often benefited scientists, 
their institutions, and their governments at the expense of those who have contributed 
narratives, effort, and material samples as humanitarian gestures, if not by force or 
deception. From the perspective of the researched, research can circumscribe one in 
debilitating theories (Deloria 1969), be useless to the donor or research subject (as in the 
Lacks case), be done without informed consent (see Harriet Washington [2008] on the 
history of medical experimentation on African Americans), and overpower the truths 
peoples want to tell about themselves and their own histories (see Tallbear [2013] on 
Kennewick Man). 
Indonesia’s actions brought to light the need for an expanded sense of materiality in 
response to the virus: curing ill patients would require not only cladistics and sequencing but 
also the production and distribution of drugs (some of which existed only as concepts) and 
the financial means to acquire them. Supari speculated that even though the seed stock for a 
future vaccine might come from Indonesia, the vaccine supply would be produced, stored, 
and distributed by developed countries, allowing them control over which countries could 
access the drug supply. This was not idle speculation but was based upon her observation of 
what had happened with Tamiflu, the antiviral drug recommended to lessen the severity of 
influenza in affected patients and called for in the Karo outbreak. Upon discovering that 
Western countries had stockpiled available supplies of Tamiflu, Dr. Supari (2006, 5) said, 
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‘The incident of sweeping out of the Tamiflu stock by developed countries that had no cases 
of the disease really made a deep wound in my heart’. While the GISRS could produce 
cladistics that mapped viral evolution and would feed into pandemic-preparedness plans, 
these plans were what Tobias Rees (2014) describes as ‘the dreamy side of modernity’; they 
were ultimately phantasmagoria that would not cure sick Indonesians in the case of an 
outbreak. 
Security, paranoia, resentment, and mistrust 
Rather than recognize the historically situated truth of Dr. Supari’s objection, the 
predominant response of the international community to the idea of viral sovereignty was 
cynicism and mistrust. In the Washington Post, Richard Holbrook and Laurie Garrett (2008, 
B7-R) wrote in the derisive style often heard in public, and more often in private, within the 
global health community: 
Here’s a concept you’ve probably never heard of: “viral sovereignty.” This extremely 
dangerous idea comes to us courtesy of Indonesia’s minister of health, Siti Fadilah 
Supari, who asserts that deadly viruses are the sovereign property of individual 
nations—even though they cross borders and could pose a pandemic threat to all the 
peoples of the world. So far “viral sovereignty” has been noted almost exclusively by 
health experts. Political leaders around the world should take note—and take very 
strong action. 
The Holbrooke/Garrett excerpt expresses the paranoia of an international global health 
community that feared its ability to prepare for an influenza pandemic was being put at risk 
by its inability to impose its expertise on Indonesia. This paranoia was mirrored on the 
Indonesian side among those who were suspicious of the international community’s motives 
and concerned that there might be more at stake here than vaccine production or even 
human health. Despite her moral victory in identifying the protocols of the WHO as an elite 
project that overlooked Indonesian interests, Dr. Supari turned her work at the Ministry of 
Health into a platform for paranoia and resentment. Drawing on Nietzsche’s elaboration of 
the concept, Wendy Brown (1995, 68) describes ressentiment as having three characteristics: ‘It 
produces an affect (rage, righteousness) that overcomes the hurt, it produces a culprit 
responsible for the hurt, and it produces a site of revenge to displace the hurt (a place to 
inflict hurt as the sufferer has been hurt). Together these ameliorate and externalize … what 
is otherwise unendurable’. In a climate where some Indonesians were claiming that the bird 
flu intervention was a way for the Freemasons to infiltrate Indonesia (Haroki 2009), that 
H5N1 was deliberately spread by the United States in order to dominate the poultry market 
(FMKP 2007), or that the flu was bioengineered by the West to control Indonesia (Baskara 
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2008), Dr. Supari used her ministerial power to extend her argument into a vision of global 
health as an international conspiracy.  
Trust and mistrust are fundamental to the experience of potential catastrophic risk. Giddens 
(1990, 34) explains how trust and expert systems are intertwined and understood in relation 
to risk: ‘Trust may be defined as confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding 
a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or 
love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles (technical knowledge)’. In the 
H5N1 intervention, probity, love, and technical knowledge were all at stake. While the 
international community fretted over Indonesia’s technical capacities, residents of Kabanjahe 
were unsure of the minister’s probity, and there was no love lost between Dr. Supari and the 
international community. Further, Giddens (1990, 90) writes, ‘respect for technical 
knowledge usually exists in conjunction with a pragmatic attitude towards abstract systems, 
based upon attitudes of skepticism or reserve’. What is unusual here is that, unlike the 
villagers of Kabanjahe, who were at a distance from expert knowledge, Dr. Supari’s 
skepticism and reserve came from within the expert system that she was the very face of, 
both in Indonesia and internationally. Further, her probity came into question by the end of 
her time as minister, when she was accused by the Indonesian Corruption and Eradication 
Commission of taking kickbacks in the procurement of medical equipment to fight the 
influenza outbreak. By 2014, Dr. Supari was under indictment, and in 2017 she was 
sentenced to a four-year prison term and a fine of 200 million rupiah for corrupt practices 
(Jakarta Post 2017). 
In a world being organized around viral matter, the status of the material virus also generated 
mistrust and insecurity, and Dr. Supari put forth the idea that it may have been biologically 
engineered. Los Alamos National Laboratory had maintained a pathogen database for 
influenza and was keeping Indonesian samples. Dr. Supari claimed that since Los Alamos 
was the site of the Manhattan Project, there must be a nefarious reason for their interest in 
Indonesian influenzas: ‘It is not impossible that there will be a group of people in the 
developed countries that are insane enough to reengineer the viruses to create outbreaks in 
the third world. Don’t you realize that if you have the expertise and the sophisticated facility 
to develop [a] vaccine, you also possess the genetic engineering capability to create new and 
more virulent viruses?’ (Supari 2006, 124). And she had other questions. Why had Indonesia 
been asked to destroy its reserve of smallpox vaccine after the global eradication of 
smallpox? Was it so that the developed countries could use smallpox against the rest of the 
world? Was her commercial flight from Tehran to Geneva deliberately delayed so that she 
could not make a speech on viral sovereignty at the Palace of Nations? Why did the press 
pay more attention to ‘Dede the Tree Man’, an Indonesian victim of human papilloma virus 
who grew giant tree bark–like scales on his hands and feet, than to her? Why was she made 
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to wait ten minutes when she showed up unannounced at the US Naval Medical Research 
Unit II in Jakarta? Was the United States using H5N1 samples to make biological weapons?  
Perceived slights and paranoid speculations resonated with Indonesian and international 
commentators with different stakes in the future of health. This was not the paranoid style 
of the marginalized or uneducated. This was the ‘paranoia within reason’ that George 
Marcus (1999) describes inhabiting elite political and scientific institutions. He writes of a 
post–Cold War paranoia that responds to the rapidity of social change, and he links a new 
form of paranoid speculation and skepticism to the desire to solve social problems through 
the engine of reason and progress, in the context where this same modernity has been 
undermined by new forms of risk and failure. Commentators in the global North believed 
Supari was using the sample-sharing issue to deflect attention from failures in the Ministry of 
Health or to appeal to Islamists in the country (Elbe 2010). Cold War assumptions about 
power and alignment no longer held true: Holbrooke and Garrett were upset by the capacity 
of a postcolonial nation to interfere with their sense of apocalyptic urgency and plans for 
global security. Holbrooke and Garrett (2008, BR-7) demanded political leaders ‘take very 
strong action’.  
Nils Bubandt (2008) argues that conspiracy is a pervasive form of political explanation in 
Indonesia; the figure of the shadow-puppet master (dalang) who stands behind political 
events is an enduring trope of Indonesian political analysis. For Indonesians, the master 
puppeteer in the international realm is the United States. While the conspiratorial idea may 
indeed be ‘sensible’, the point for Bubandt (2008, 810) is to understand ‘how political action 
takes place within such a discourse of political paranoia’. Kathleen Stewart (1999), on the 
other hand, argues that conspiracy can be viewed as a re-enactment of trauma; if so, one 
could argue that conspiracy has been a form of traumatic postcolonial political commentary 
in Indonesia for a long time. Rather than positing Dr. Supari as a rational actor who 
‘deploys’ conspiracy instrumentally, we could argue that it is entirely within reason for her to 
believe that the United States does not have Indonesian interests at heart, that the 
international community has at least the capacity to damage Indonesia by mobilizing science 
and technology, and that Northern projects of public health are aligned with Northern and 
not Indonesian security interests. In a pandemic-preparedness project supposed to address 
speculative danger, the virus cannot account for all forms of risk.  
Failures of viral sovereignty 
The virus may not account for all risk, but it can account for something. At this point in the 
story, having acknowledged the value of Dr. Supari’s intervention, I take a different tack to 
ask more about the viral object. What about Dr. Supari’s multinaturalist (Vivieros de Castro 
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2015) claim that Indonesians don’t get the flu? Studying influenza, it is impossible not to 
bring the force and trajectory of influenza’s material becoming into the equation. While Dr. 
Supari’s concept of viral sovereignty allowed for powerful moral claims upon the global 
health community, her response to the viral outbreak failed to account for its ontology 
across Indonesian worlds. Dr. Supari doesn’t consider how Indonesian H5N1 was evolving 
through the transnational transportation of poultry, its roots in commercial farming in 
Thailand and Guandong province in China (which could make it a ‘Thai’ or a ‘Chinese’ 
virus), or the way international scientific networks were indispensable for sensing the 
presence of the virus. Indeed, the virus did not ‘exist’ without the prosthetic capacities of an 
expanded international network; the vast majority of people die in Indonesia without a 
medical diagnosis, leaving much epidemiological data on the causes of mortality and 
morbidity invisible. While Dr. Supari presented herself as advancing Indonesian science, she 
often did not seem to value microbiology or medicine as ways to make sense of the world, or 
to acknowledge the collaborations that make contemporary research or clinical practice 
possible in Indonesia as in other places. As the central person responsible for the health of 
the Indonesian public and as the person in charge of advancing Indonesia’s medical research 
capacity, Dr. Supari would have done well to ask deeper questions about the influenza 
plaguing her country, questions the discursive immateriality of her nationalism alone could 
never answer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Chicks from the Thai-owned Charoen Pokphand arrive at the Jakarta airport. Photo by C. Lowe. 
Indonesians do, for example, get the flu. Not only were they the most numerically significant 
victims of H5N1 jumps from poultry into humans across the globe at that time; Indonesians 
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also get the ordinary annual flu. Yet in relation to the seasonal flu vaccine, Dr. Supari (2007, 
12) claimed that she feels fortunate that Indonesians don’t need it: ‘Each time we are 
suffering from the common influenza, it is easy to control it. We need only symptomatic 
medicine (such as Bodrex, Panadol, and so on) even the method we call kerokan. But among 
Europeans, the same influenza can be lethal, especially in complication with pneumonia. 
That is why their need of seasonal flu vaccine is uncompromised’. 
Coming in the midst of an influenza crisis, Dr. Supari’s comment shows a profound lack of 
technical understanding of the conditions of influenza lethality; the influenza lethality she 
claims Europeans alone are vulnerable to is, in truth, applicable to anyone. Indeed, mortality 
estimates of the infamous 1918 influenza pandemic for the island of Java are 4.25 to 4.37 
million (Chandra 2013) and greater for the entire Indonesian archipelago. Interest in 
pandemic flu in the 2000s caused a significant transformation in understanding influenza in 
the tropics. In research at the Federal University of Ceará in Brazil, Dr. Fernanda Moura 
(2010) observes that the avian-influenza outbreak and the 2009 swine flu sparked a surge of 
studies on the epidemiology, genetic diversity, and antiviral resistance of influenza in the 
tropics. Her meta-analysis, focused on the global South, points to an influenza prevalence 
comparable to or higher than that of temperate countries. Further, resistance to antivirals is 
common across tropical settings despite their rare use. Moura argues that there is much 
more work to do on the seasonality of influenza in tropical countries and that understanding 
seasonality is important to influenza prevention and control. 
While acknowledging the juridico-political importance of the claim of viral sovereignty, it is 
also important to acknowledge those scientists from the global South like Dr. Moura, or the 
many Indonesian scientists who are no less patriotic than Dr. Supari, who nevertheless wish 
to use empirical methods to understand influenza. It was two Indonesian scientists – 
Indonesia’s former director of animal health, Dr. Tri Satya Putri Naipospos (who first spoke 
to the press and was fired from the Ministry of Agriculture for revealing there was H5N1 
influenza in Indonesia) and Professor of Microbiology Chairul Nidom (who first detected 
the virus in Indonesian chickens and made his findings public) – who brought the outbreak 
into the open and demanded the Indonesian government respond. One might also 
appreciate the many Indonesians who found Dr. Supari inadequate in her job and 
irresponsible in her pronouncements. In response to Dr. Supari’s statement that Indonesians 
don’t get the flu and Western governments could have genetically engineered and spread the 
2009 swine flu to boost pharmaceutical profits, one H. Mustapha (2009) from Bekasi 
answered in a Jakarta newspaper: 
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This Minister should RESIGN immediately. Her many comments on this issue are 
disgusting. In one interview, according to NEWSWEEK she claims Indonesians 
cannot be infected with Flu. What an amateur she is. Are we Indonesians 
SUPERHUMAN, Please get rid of this INCOMPETENT person. Where did she get 
her Degrees, I hope not thru the ‘express’ system. … It is obvious the current 
Minister does little to educate us, so we should search for solutions on our own, and 
please let us share any info that is important. Please Mr. President, make sure the next 
Minister of Health is COMPETENT. Thank you Sir. 
Wendy Brown (1995) argues that contemporary politicized identity discourse is limited in its 
political effects when it proposes a ‘unified “I” disenfranchised by an exclusive “we”’. When 
I read aloud H. Mustapha’s comment in the midst of a talk at a History of Medicine in 
Southeast Asia conference in Laos in 2018, I was startled when the audience, led by the 
retired Laotian minister of health, who had led his country’s response to the influenza 
outbreak, and several of the Indonesian conference participants, interrupted with applause. 
In this case, their fear was that Southeast Asians would not be counted among the 
‘competent’ global technocratic elite who were fighting the outbreak of H5N1. ‘Sovereignty’ 
could not account for many of the biological, medical, or technical ambitions of 
Indonesians, nor could it speak for the virus in any robust way. 
Viral matters 
Part of the competence that H. Mustapha was calling for is what Donna Haraway (2016) has 
termed ‘staying with the trouble’: avoiding the backward-looking nature of postcolonial 
annihilation or the future orientation of technoscientific apocalypse to instead notice how 
people, their livestock, and microbes live interconnected lives and shape one another. There 
is an element of viral matter that allows it to exceed its capture within human imagination, an 
agency of things that is interrelated with but not dependent upon human projects or 
identities. As the central actor in the outbreak, H5N1 would resist and exceed both the 
practices of securitization and the form of knowing that places injury and resentment at the 
center of things. This does not indicate that its mutations were independent of relationality 
with human practices, though.  
Most sciences of pandemic preparedness emphasize the study of proximate causes of 
virulence (those internal to the virus), like typing emergent strains and following their spread, 
but in the case of H5N1 little attention was being paid to what the evolutionary biologist 
Paul Ewald (1991) considers the ‘ultimate’ causes of its deadliness. Ewald argues that if we 
want to understand what makes a microbe evolve virulence, we need to look not just inside 
the virus but outside, to what he calls its ‘cultural’ environment. Ewald speculates, for 
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example, that in 1918, the influenza strain only became so deadly in the context of warfare in 
Europe. If a pathogen kills off its host rapidly (in other words, is virulent), then usually that 
host cannot move to infect others, and virulent genotypes are thereby selected against. But if 
there is a large population of susceptible hosts nearby, as in the trench warfare of World War 
I, then there is no barrier to virulent genotype survival. Viral evolution under conditions of 
trench warfare can further explain why young healthy people, rather than children and the 
elderly, were most vulnerable to the 1918 pandemic influenza; the virus had evolved within 
this demographic.   
The phylogeographer Robert Wallace (2009, 2016), who first identified the site of H5N1’s 
emergence as Guandong, China, was working on the genetic sequences of H5N1 influenza 
when he realized that sequences alone could not tell him why the strain had emerged there. 
He needed an analysis of the economic geography of the area (what Ewald had called the 
‘culture’ or ‘ultimate cause’) to answer this question. And for him the answer lay in the 
introduction to South China of the practice of confined animal feeding. In a population of 
wild birds, influenza will cause mild disease, so the sick bird can still move around and 
transmit the virus to another host: as in the human case just described, virulence is selected 
against. Things are different in the industrial henhouse, however. If the henhouse provides 
an unlimited supply of new and susceptible hosts, then there is no evolutionary cost to 
virulence. The conditions of industrial poultry production place thousands of genetically 
monocultured, stressed, and immunocompromised birds on top of one another. Genetic 
mutations for high pathogenesis thrive in this socioecological environment. 
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Figure 2. Industrial poultry processing in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. Photo by C. Lowe. 
 
Wallace (2009) also answers the question of how the disease originated in the Guandong 
region. The industrial sector in South China rose in the space of the densely farmed 
domestic duck cultivation that had been prominent and unproblematic in the region since 
the Qing dynasty. South China has the greatest mix of influenza serotypes, and influenza 
circulates year-round there. Close proximity to human populations and live bird markets add 
to the mix. However, none of this could have produced the deadly H5N1 virus without the 
‘livestock revolution’. Wallace (2009, 916–51) writes, ‘in reorganizing its stockbreeding 
industries under the American model of vertically integrated farming, Chinese farming 
helped accelerate a phase change in influenza ecology selecting for strains of greater 
virulence, wider host range, and greater diversity’. Wallace’s review of the literature further 
reveals that there were no highly pathogenic strains circulating in wild birds, the natural 
reservoir for avian influenzas, before those associated with industrial farming. 
By emphasizing a ‘molecular narrative’ (Braun 2007) rather than the industrial ecological 
setting of viral evolution, much about the H5N1 outbreak was never made visible in the 
international pandemic intervention, and much was left unnoticed by both international and 
Indonesian experts responsible for responding to H5N1. The US Agency for International 
Development, for example, worked on influenza in Indonesia for five years before it began 
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to engage the industrial sector seriously. While Indonesia’s minister of health may have 
dismissed influenza as a powerful entity in the world, it was also as though the international 
community had declared that industrial chickens don’t get the flu. The prophetic powers of 
preparedness planners were as divorced from the scientific reality of the human relationship 
to this evolutionary story as Dr. Supari was in her statement that Indonesians are not 
vulnerable to influenza.  
Industrial agriculture has both expanded the meat supply for human consumption and 
damaged our planet by injecting effluent, chemicals, and pathogens into the biosphere we 
inhabit. In thinking about ‘the arts of living on a damaged planet’, Swanson and colleagues 
(2017, 7) write, ‘The seductive simplifications of industrial production threaten to render us 
blind to monstrosity in all its forms by covering over both lively and destructive 
connections. … Living in a time of planetary catastrophe thus begins with a practice at once 
humble and difficult: noticing the worlds around us’. H5N1 influenza may be a disease of 
‘our own hatching’ (Greger 2006), yet it is more than a conspiracy. If we think of objects as 
having world-making intensity rather than simply reflecting constructed social perspectives 
or positionality, then we must ask what kinds of future worlds are being made by the 
influenza virus in concert with which multispecies, political, and economic relationships; we 
cannot ask only about the identity or positionality of the human actors involved. This is why 
it matters that some Indonesians, like Dr. Naipospos and Dr. Nidom, were paying close 
attention to how the H5N1 virus was creeping across Indonesian farms and emerging into 
human populations. Both stuck closely to the virus to speculate on what the dangers may or 
may not have been to Indonesia or the world. Animals, plants, and microbes have agency in 
the future of health just as humans do.  
Return to Kebanjahe 
When the Indonesian ministers of health, welfare, and agriculture descended upon 
Kabanjahe in their Tyvek suits and goggles, they must have looked like astronauts landing on 
the moon. The people of Kebanjahe saw through the ministers’ theatrical security 
performance, though, realizing they weren’t being protected by their act. They also believed 
that there was no evidence of H5N1 in their village. A crowd surrounded the ministers, 
berated them, and yelled for them to take off their masks and face the people directly, 
demanding they not cull their poultry and admit there was no bird flu in Kebanjahe. The 
villagers were concerned with preserving their chickens but also with the reputation the 
village had gained for being infected when they believed it wasn’t. Sensing that mortal danger 
came more directly from the mob than from the virus, the ministers shed their protective 
gear, cancelled their inspection of the village, and retreated to their vehicles (Asmarani 2006). 
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In a context where major US and international multilateral political and administrative 
institutions were concerned with anthrax attacks, biological weapons, smallpox outbreaks, or 
SARS, the influenza virus was taken up as a threat to global security rather than as a matter 
of human or animal care. As security was materially and symbolically enacted in the 
outbreak, events in Karo crystallized questions of who was being secured from what, and 
how. The people of Kabanjahe, caring about the virus by looking for its effects and finding 
none, refused to be made secure by ministers who they believed had only their own personal 
safety and political careers in mind. Similarly, while the global health community presented 
the H5N1 outbreak as an apocalyptic event of global importance that required Indonesia’s 
cooperation, Dr. Supari pressed the WHO to accept the idea that such cooperation in turn 
must benefit Indonesia. While some Indonesians feared the power of the international 
community to render it helpless in the event of an outbreak, other Indonesians were afraid 
they would lose their capacity to participate in modern molecular biology, and still others 
feared poultry culls would devastate their livelihoods. 
Many invisible and barely perceptible objects and processes lie in wait along a trajectory set 
to shape our future. From the hidden toxins that will give us cancer someday to the 
imperceptible greenhouse gases driving climate change, the future is uncertain and insecure. 
As Haraway (2016, 1) writes, ‘in urgent times, many of us are tempted to address trouble in 
terms of making an imagined future safe, of stopping something from happening that looms 
in the future, of clearing away the present and the past in order to make futures for coming 
generations’. Security is never generic, however; what is contained within a past or present 
that cannot be easily cleared away allows us to make sense of the futures we individually and 
collectively desire. Both the people of Kebanjahe and the Indonesian minister of health had 
fears and concerns that did not make sense when filtered through the international 
community’s anxious approach to a speculative global pandemic, and, likewise, the global 
health community’s fear of a global influenza pandemic did not translate in a country where 
dengue, road injury, and diabetes were the top national health concerns. From protecting 
chickens to protecting the global economy, from protecting the reputation of a village to 
protecting the image of the nation, stakes in the future of health were multiple and extended 
beyond the speculative pandemic to reflect uniquely positioned anxieties. 
In the global health intervention to prevent an H5N1 influenza pandemic, technical 
expertise emphasized cladistics, scenario reenactments, hand washing, and stamping out 
outbreaks; it did not suggest intervening in the profit centers of industrial agribusiness that 
were the context, or ‘culture’, of viral pathogenesis. As the virus evolved the capacity to 
transmit between genetically related humans in Karo Regency, the virus was an active 
element with the capacity to do something, though it never became clear precisely what. 
Within the borders of confined animal feeding operations, the virus was also active such that 
new highly pathogenic strains were emerging at a rapid pace in tandem with industrial animal 
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production and the global traffic in animals and their parts. Dr. Supari’s apocalyptic view of 
a world in which the ‘West’ deliberately bioengineers viruses to wipe out Indonesia and its 
economy subsumed that agentive virus and its capacity to inflict harm under the ‘wounded 
attachments’ of her nation. And Holbrooke and Garrett’s sense that viral sovereignty put 
global health at risk inflated the capacities of sample sharing to intervene in the evolutionary 
life course of the virus at the expense of empathy for Indonesian arguments about equity. 
Yet vital matter is never simply recursive to human identity or interpretation. The world has 
remained secure from an H5N1 human pandemic thus far not because we were ‘prepared’ 
but because the virus did not make the evolutionary jump required for sustained human 
transmission. Similarly, as the global health community rendered H5N1 manifest through its 
lens of security, the paranoia and mistrust associated with securitizing health inhibited care 
and attention to the emergence of viral pathogenesis that could have brought the virus into 
focus in less apocalyptic yet still deeply serious ways. Neither the monocausal postcolonial 
critique that reduces the material world to manifestations of resentment nor the molecular 
worldview that would ask us to respond to objects only as they appear under a microscope 
without a network of interconnected human practices is sufficient for making sense of our 
world or responding to it. In the play of security, paranoia, resentment, and distrust, as 
‘monarchs of being’ we lose sight of the objects, entities, and others with whom we are 
among, entangled, and implicated. 
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